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ABSTRACT
Despite the intellectual property system’s success in
promoting the economic well-being of the United States, this
system has not achieved all socially valuable ends. Insufficient
treatments are applied both to diseases endemic in developing
countries, such as malaria, and rare diseases, such as rare
childhood cancers. Several legislative tools aim to promote
socially valuable drugs and biologics through market incentives.
The priority review voucher (PRV) program is the latest and
most unique of these legislative tools aimed at encouraging the
development of drugs for neglected diseases without burdening
taxpayers. The Creating Hope Act—recently signed into law as
part of the Food & Drug Administration Safety & Innovation
Act—extends the PRV program to rare pediatric diseases. This
Issue Brief argues that some provisions in this new legislation
may result in undesirable collateral effects that could prevent the
legislation from fulfilling its objective of encouraging investment
in treatments for rare pediatric diseases.

INTRODUCTION
“Everybody wins,” President Reagan declared from the Rose
Garden on the day he signed the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act) into law.1 The
Hatch-Waxman Act sought to carefully “strike[] a balance between two
potentially
competing
policy
interests—inducing
pioneering
development of pharmaceutical formulations and methods and
facilitating efficient transition to a market with low-cost, generic copies
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Remarks on Signing S. 1538 into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1359
(Sept. 24, 1984).
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of those pioneering inventions at the close of a patent term.”2 The
legislation sought to accomplish this objective by offering distinct
incentives for generic manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, and
consumers.
For generic manufacturers, the Hatch-Waxman Act
promised to hasten generic entry with a mechanism for abbreviated
applications for drugs with active ingredients that the FDA had already
approved.3 For pharmaceutical companies, the Hatch-Waxman Act
granted up to five additional years of patent protection for new drugs to
make up for time spent under regulatory review.4 Finally, President
Reagan estimated that consumers would “save more than a billion dollars
over the next 10 years.”5
Civilized society has long grappled with the challenge of
balancing individual reward with the public good.6 The Hatch-Waxman
Act has achieved much of this balance through meeting its primary goal
of bringing low-cost generic drugs to market without burdening
consumers.7 In fact, President Reagan’s estimate that consumers would
2

Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Lab., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3057, 180 L. Ed. 2d 884 (2011), and rev’d, 132
S. Ct. 1670, 182 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2012).
3
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)
and 35 U.S.C. § 156)
4
Id. at § 201.
5
Remarks on Signing S. 1538 into Law, supra note 2.
6
In Aristotle’s Politics, Aristotle condemns as unsafe Hippodamus’s idea of
rewarding individuals for discovering things useful to the state. ROBERT
PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1–2 (5th ed. 2011). The United States Constitution also
embodies the tension between individual self-interest and social benefit by
granting the Congress the power to give inventors exclusive rights to their
discoveries overlaid with the objective “To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7
See GPhA Says New Study Shows that Hatch-Waxman is a Successful Model
for Biogenerics Legislation Exclusivity Provisions Similar to Those in HatchWaxman Would Promote Competition and Innovation, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N
(Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.gphaonline.org/media/press-releases/2009/02/12/g
pha-says-new-study-shows-hatch-waxman-successful-model-biogenerics(“Generics represent 65% of the total prescriptions dispensed in the United
States, but only 20% of all dollars spent on prescription drugs.”). But see, e.g.,
C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As A
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2006) (“First,
certain features of the Act widen, often by subtle means, the potential for
anticompetitive harm from pay-for-delay settlements. Second, the Act reflects a
congressional judgment favoring litigated challenges, contrary to arguments
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save $1 billion dollars in the first ten years after enactment of the HatchWaxman Act may have been considerably understated.
The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that, in 1994 alone, consumers
saved between $8 and $10 billion from substituting generic drugs for
brand-name drugs.8
The U.S. regulatory and patent system, however, has not
achieved all socially valuable ends. Social deficiencies are particularly
pronounced for diseases endemic in developing countries.
Pharmaceutical firms are under a fiduciary responsibility to maximize
profits and to recoup their research and development costs (estimated to
be $800 million up to $12 billion).9 Consequently, executives often
choose to develop more profitable drugs rather than drugs designed to
treat diseases endemic in developing countries.10 For example, as a
result of the low per capita income and weak patent protection in
developing tropical countries, less than ten percent of global research and
development expenditures are focused on neglected tropical diseases.
Nevertheless, these diseases “account for over ninety percent of the
global disease burden.”11 This discrepancy between research
expenditures and disease burden is known as the “10/90 gap.”12
The profound impact that the high risk-to-return ratio for drugs
to treat tropical diseases has on deterring investment is even more salient
when the category of neglected tropical diseases is subdivided. Some
tropical diseases (such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis) affect people in
employed to justify these settlements.”); Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing
Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the
Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 173 (2008) (“But the
original Act also contained provisions that were exploited by patent holders to
delay generic competition, thereby extending their monopoly sales.”).
8
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at ix
(1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/10938.
9
Joseph A, DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003) (“[W]e
estimated that total R&D cost per new drug is US$ 802 million in 2000
dollars.”); Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs,
FORBES (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2
012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs (“AstraZeneca has
spent $12 billion in research money for every new drug approved . . . .”).
10
James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New
Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1527 (2007).
11
Ann Weilbaecher, Comment, Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries:
How to Incentivize Innovation, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 281, 284 (2009).
12
Id.
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both developed and developing countries and therefore receive moderate
private investment.13 Other tropical diseases (such as leishmaniasis,
schistosomiasis, and trichuriasis), however, overwhelmingly appear in
developing countries and therefore receive little private investment.14
Various entities have implemented strategies designed to correct
market failures in the patent system and promote the public good.
Broadly defined, two strategies have emerged to increase investment in
treatments for neglected diseases. The first strategy involves “push”
mechanisms. Push mechanisms provide research dollars ex ante to
reduce initial investment risk.15 These mechanisms include grants for
research and development (R&D), tax credits, and fast-track approval.16
For example, donors in product development partnerships (PDPs), such
as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, will fund a drug developer at
the outset or on a stage-by-stage basis.17 In contrast, the second strategy
involves the use of “pull” mechanisms. These mechanisms reward
innovation with economic benefits ex post,18 including advanced market
commitments (AMCs), market exclusivity provisions, patent term
extensions, priority review vouchers, and prizes.19 The United States
Patent and Trademark Office, for example, recently instituted a prize of
accelerated processing of future patent applications for patent owners
who have used their patents for humanitarian needs.20
The U.S. government has instituted several push and pull
mechanisms to address the unique market failures in the pharmaceutical
industry. These push and pull legislative tools—each of which are aimed
at impacting drug development for neglected diseases—include the
Orphan Drug Act (ODA),21 Pediatric Exclusivity Provision in the Food
and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA),22 Best
13

ADRIAN TOWSE ET AL., OFFICE OF HEALTH ECON., DRUGS AND VACCINES FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 6 (2011), http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dbr1/resear
ch/developing-Oxford.pdf.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 5.
16
Id. at 21.
17
Id. at 22.
18
Id. at 5.
19
Id. at 21.
20
Patents for Humanity, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/patents_for_humanity.jsp (last updated
Aug. 20, 2012).
21
Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 35 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
22
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105115, § 111, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 351).
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Pharmaceutical Practices for Children Act,23 Pediatric Research Equity
Act,24 and the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
which instituted a priority review voucher (PRV) program.25 The PRV
program rewards developers of neglected tropical disease products ex
post. The reward consists of transferable vouchers for future priority
review on a subsequent drug or biologic before the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).26 By promising to incentivize the development
of tropical disease products without burdening taxpayers or delaying
generic entry, the PRV program seeks to benefit all constituents
including disease sufferers, innovators, and taxpayers.27
The latest legislative pull mechanism aimed at encouraging
investment in drugs for neglected diseases is the Creating Hope Act of
2011, which was enacted in July 2012 as part of the Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA). The Act was
specifically designed to extend the PRV program from simply rewarding
developers of tropical disease drugs to rewarding developers of rare
pediatric disease products.28 A rare disease, or “orphan disease,” is a
disease that affects less than 2-7 individuals per 10,000 in a country.29
Companies tend to invest little in drugs to treat these rare diseases
because they are unlikely to recoup their development costs. Drug
developers’ hesitancy is manifest: the FDA last approved a new
molecular entity for treating pediatric cancer over twenty years ago.30
Although the PRV program, like the Hatch-Waxman Act, has great
potential to ensure that “everybody wins,” several provisions in the new
legislation may actually undermine that objective.

23

Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408
(2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
24
Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
25
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
26
David B. Ridley, Henry G. Grabowski & Jeffrey L. Moe, Developing Drugs
for Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. 313, 313-15 (2006).
27
Id. at 319-21.
28
Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112—
144, § 908, 126 Stat. 993 (2012) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 360ff).
29
D.A. Hughes et al., Drugs for Exceptionally Rare Diseases: Do They Deserve
Special Status for Funding?, 98 QJM 829, 829 (2005).
30
Steven Hirschfeld et al., Regulatory Approvals of Pediatric Oncology Drugs:
Previous Experience and New Initiatives, 21 J. CLIN. ONCOLOGY 1066 (2003)
(FDA approved teniposide for childhood leukemia in 1992).
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I. EXISTING LEGISLATIVE TOOLS FOR PROMOTING SOCIALLY
VALUABLE DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS
A. Orphan Drug Act of 1983
The Orphan Drug Act (ODA) seeks to encourage the
development of drugs for neglected diseases through providing market
incentives.
“The ODA was enacted in order to provide drug
manufacturers with incentives to develop ‘orphan’ drugs—that is, drugs
for the treatment of rare diseases or disorders that affect only small
patient populations.”31 The FDA deems a condition “rare” if it “affects
less than 200,000 persons in the United States” or if “there is no
reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making available
in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be
recovered from sales in the United States of such drug.”32 Even a disease
like cholera, with 3–5 million cases worldwide, may qualify as an orphan
disease under the ODA because it affects only approximately ten
individuals living within the United States each year.33
The market incentives provided by the ODA include seven years
of market exclusivity—even without a patent—tax credits for up to fifty
percent of qualified clinical testing expenses, and research grants for
clinical testing of new drugs for rare diseases.34 Of these market
incentives, the Office of Health and Human Services (HHS) concluded—
based on interviews with thirty-six biotechnology and pharmaceutical
companies—that drug-producing entities valued market exclusivity as
the most important incentive in the ODA.35 Despite the fact that
competition for most orphan products is sparse, these entities believed
that the assurance of market exclusivity helped them secure public and
private capital.36

31

Sigma-Tau Pharm., Inc. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 144 (4th Cir. 2002).
21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2008).
33
Cholera, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 2012), http://www.who.int/media
centre/factsheets/fs107/en/; E. Steinberg, et al., Cholera in the United States,
1995-2000: Trends at the End of the Twentieth Century, 184 J. INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 799, 800 (2001).
34
Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, §§ 2(a), 3, 5, 96 Stat. 2049
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 35 U.S.C.,
and 42 U.S.C.).
35
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., THE ORPHAN
DRUG ACT – IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 8 (2001).
36
Id.
32
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HHS concluded that the ODA “unquestionably stimulated the
development [of new drugs] for rare diseases.”37 During the ten years
preceding the ODA’s enactment, only ten drugs for rare diseases were
approved by the FDA and brought to market.38 In the seventeen years
following the ODA’s enactment in 1983, however, approximately 200
drugs for rare diseases were approved by the FDA.39 Moreover, from
1979 to 1998, the number of available drugs for rare diseases increased
by over 500 percent, dwarfing the 200 percent growth of non-orphan
drugs.40 Further highlighting the success of the ODA in increasing the
availability of orphan drugs, patient groups report experiencing few
shortages of these orphan drugs even though the ODA makes no
requirement that the sponsors market and distribute the drugs.41

B. Pediatric Exclusivity Provision and Subsequent Legislation
Although the ODA led to breakthroughs in treating some rare
diseases,42 the pharmaceutical industry still lacked pediatric formulations
for treating a broad range of diseases. Many companies had no incentive
to test their drugs on pediatric populations.43 As a result, physicians had
little choice but to prescribe drugs to children that had only been tested in
adults. Because children have markedly different physiology than adults,
prescribing adult drugs to children put them at risk for adverse
reactions.44 A recent study found, for example, that extrapolating
pediatric dosages from adult dosages with weight-based calculations
could be both harmful and ineffective.45 These harmful effects may
occur because children’s bodies clear drugs at different rates than adults
depending on their maturation stage.46
37

Id. at 7.
Marlene E. Haffner, Adopting orphan drugs—Two Dozen Years of Treating
Rare Diseases, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 445, 445 (2006).
39
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 36, at 7.
40
Frank R. Lichtenberg & Joel Waldfogel, Does Misery Love Company?
Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets Before and After the Orphan Drug Act
3 Fig.1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W9750, 2003),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9750.
41
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 36, at 9.
42
Id. at 7.
43
Aaron S. Kesselheim, Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives to Promote
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1855, 1859 (2010).
44
Id.
45
William Rodriguez et al., Improving Pediatric Dosing Through Pediatric
Initiatives: What We Have Learned, 121 PEDIATRICS 530, 530 (2008).
46
Id.
38
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Congress has passed several legislative acts to ameliorate the
deficiency in drugs to treat pediatric diseases. The Pediatric Exclusivity
Provision in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of
1997 (FDAMA) awards a drug sponsor with six months of additional
marketing exclusivity when the sponsor conducts timely pediatric
studies.47
The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA)
encourages more research on drugs for children.48 In 2007, Congress
passed legislation requiring the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to
publish a priority list of needs in pediatric pharmaceuticals.49 The
Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA) of 2003 granted the FDA
authority to require research for certain drugs used in pediatric
populations.50 Finally, in 2009, the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act extended the BPCA to biologics, as well as substances
derived from biological sources used to treat diseases.51
These legislative acts provide strong incentives to drug sponsors
to conduct pediatric studies. The Institute of Medicine—the health arm
of the National Academy of Sciences—has concluded that these
legislative acts have been largely successful.52 In 1998, the year just
after FDAMA’s passage, drug labels were changed to reflect pediatric
dosing information for only three products.53 In 2009, however, the
FDAMA resulted in over forty drug labels changing to reflect pediatric
information.54 Furthermore, by 2005, approximately 108 drug products
47

Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 111, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
48
Pub. L. No. 107-109, § 3, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
49
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
§ 502, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C.) (“[T]he Secretary, acting through the Director of the National
Institutes of Health . . . shall develop and publish a priority list of needs in
pediatric therapeutics, including drugs or indications that require study.”).
50
Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, § 2, 117 Stat.
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
51
Biologics Price Competition & Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 7002(a), (b), (g)(1), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §
262(a)(2)(B)).
52
See INST. OF MED. OF NAT’L ACAD., REPORT BRIEF: SAFE AND EFFECTIVE
MEDICINES FOR CHILDREN: PEDIATRIC STUDIES CONDUCTED UNDER THE BEST
PHARMACEUTICALS FOR CHILDREN ACT AND THE PEDIATRIC RESEARCH EQUITY
ACT 1 (2012), available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2012/Safe-andEffective-Medicines-for-Children.aspx. But see Kesselheim, supra note 43, at
1859.
53
Id. at 2 fig.
54
Id.
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had undergone pediatric testing largely because of the FDAMA.55
Approximately one-fifth of these pediatric tests resulted in significant
label changes because of younger patients’ lower or higher rates of
clearing drugs from their systems.56

C. Priority Review Vouchers (PRV) in the Food & Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007
1. The idea behind Priority Review Vouchers (PRVs)
Recognizing the financial barriers to developing drugs for
neglected tropical diseases, Professors Ridley, Grabowski, and Moe
(hereinafter Ridley et al.) at Duke University proposed a plan to link the
development of essential drugs for diseases endemic in developing
countries with priority FDA approval for more profitable drugs.57 Under
Ridley et al.’s novel proposal, a drug sponsor earns a PRV when it
develops a drug to treat a neglected tropical disease.58 The drug sponsor
can then redeem the PRV for expedited FDA review of any other drug,
even non-essential or mass-market medicines that are potentially highly
profitable.59 Before PRVs existed, the FDA only granted priority review
in limited circumstances such as for drug products “where no satisfactory
alternative therapy exists” or that represented “significant improvement
compared to marketed products.”60 Priority review itself provides a
significant advantage to drug manufacturers, as it can reduce regulatory
review by up to seven months.61 Ridley et al. estimated that a PRV
“would be worth more than $300 million for a potential blockbuster

55

Rodriguez, supra note 45, at 531.
Id.
57
Ridley, supra note 26, at 313.
58
Id. at 313–314.
59
Id. at 314.
60
OFFICE OF NEW DRUGS, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, MAPP
6020.3, REVIEW CLASSIFICATION POLICY: PRIORITY (P) AND STANDARD (S) 5
(2007).
61
SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22814, FDA FAST TRACK AND
PRIORITY REVIEW PROGRAMS 5 tbl.2 (2008) (finding that the median approval
time for all standard NDAs and BLAs was 13 months in 2006 and for all priority
NDAs and BLAs was 6 months in 2006).
56
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drug, because it would shorten the time the FDA takes to analyze data
from an average of eighteen months to about six months.”62
PRV’s estimated monetary value can be illustrated by applying a
hypothetical PRV to a past “blockbuster” drug that had undergone only
standard review.
The FDA approved the antihistamine Allegra,
produced by Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., in July 1996 through
standard review.63 Allegra achieved sales of at least $1 billion by its fifth
year after product launch.64 If Hoechst had used a PRV for Allegra,
however, it might have received FDA approval in July of 1995, and
consequently reaped the benefit of entering the market one year earlier
than with standard review.65 According to Ridley et al., not only would
pharmaceutical companies like Hoechst financially benefit from priority
review, but consumers would also benefit by gaining access to the drug
earlier.66
Perhaps most significant, priority review rewards the
pharmaceutical company without harming consumers because PRVs do
not increase patent terms or delay generic pharmaceutical entry.67
Ridley et al. proposed two ways drug sponsors like Hoechst
could obtain a PRV.68 First, the FDA could award a PRV to drug
sponsors for developing a drug to treat a neglected tropical disease, such
as dengue fever. Because PRVs do not expire, the drug sponsor can save
its PRV for expedited review of any future drug. Second, one drug
sponsor can purchase a PRV from another drug sponsor, which allows
drug sponsors with few drug products in their product pipeline to sell
their PRVs to those better positioned to use them. In either scenario, the
market incentive provides both social and private welfare gains.69
The PRV program adeptly seeks these economic and social
benefits without requiring public financing or delaying generic entry.
Ridley et al.’s article proposed that the FDA charge drug sponsors a PRV
user fee to cover the extra costs of the program so the burden does not
62

In the 1990s, about half of drugs that went on to become “blockbuster drugs”
had received priority review. The other half received standard review. See
Ridley, supra note 26, at 315. But see THAUL, supra note 62.
63
Ridley, supra note 26, at 314.
64
Id.
65
See id. at 315. But see THAUL, supra note 61, at 4 (noting that the decision
time for FDA approval can vary greatly, and therefore may not be one year
longer than for priority review, depending on various factors such as staff
constraints at the FDA and completeness of the application).
66
Ridley, supra note 26, at 315.
67
Id. at 320.
68
Id. at 313.
69
See id. at 315.
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fall on taxpayers.70 Partly due to strong bipartisan support because of the
budget-neutral promise, Congress enacted the PRV provision in the Food
& Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), just a year
and a half after Ridley et al. first published their proposal.71
2. The legislation creating PRVs
Section 360n of the Food & Drug Administration Amendments
Act of 2007 (FDAAA) includes several important limitations on the
granting of PRVs. First, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
may only grant a PRV for a drug that treats a tropical disease such as
tuberculosis, malaria, cholera, dengue haemorrhagic fever, leprosy or
“[a]ny other infectious disease for which there is no significant market in
developed nations and that disproportionately affects poor and
marginalized populations, designated by regulation by the Secretary.”72
Second, the Secretary may only grant a PRV for a drug with an active
ingredient that has never been approved in any other New Drug
Application (NDA) or Biologics License Application (BLA).73 Third,
the tropical disease product must qualify for priority review to have a
chance of winning a PRV.74 Although the drug treating a tropical disease
must qualify for priority review to win a PRV, once the drug sponsor
wins the PRV it gains priority review for any subsequent drug that would
otherwise qualify only for standard review.
In addition to limits on the grant of PRVs, § 360n also includes
limits on the use of PRVs. To redeem a PRV, a drug sponsor must do
two things. First, the drug sponsor must notify the FDA of its intent to
redeem the voucher one year before it submits a NDA.75 Second, a drug
sponsor must pay a user fee to cover the extra costs incurred by the
FDA’s priority review.76 For fiscal year 2013, this user fee is $3.6
million.77 The drug sponsor becomes “legally committed” to pay the
user fee when it notifies the FDA of its intent to use the PRV one year
70

Id. at 315.
Food & Drug Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
72
21 U.S.C. § 360n(a)(3) (2011).
73
§ 360n(a)(4)(C).
74
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY
REVIEW VOUCHERS 2 (2008) [hereinafter Draft Guidance].
75
§ 360n(b)(4).
76
§ 360n(c)(1).
77
Fee for Using a Priority Review Voucher in Fiscal Year 2013, 77 Fed. Reg.
56649-01 (Sept. 13, 2012).
71
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before applying.78 To make the voucher attractive to even small drug
sponsors that do not have any potential “blockbusters” in their pipeline, a
drug sponsor that receives a PRV may “transfer (including by sale) the
entitlement to such voucher” to another entity.79 This right to transfer the
PRV promotes economic efficiency by allowing a drug sponsor to sell
the PRV to an entity better situated to profit from its use.
Under § 360n of the FDAAA, a PRV “entitles the holder of such
voucher to priority review of a single human drug application . . . .”80
When a drug sponsor redeems the voucher, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services must “review and take action on” the application within
six months.81 The phrase “review and take action on” does not guarantee
approval. Instead, within six months, an applicant will receive either
approval or an action letter “set[ting] forth in detail the specific
deficiencies that need to be addressed before the application can be
approved.”82 The FDA aims for, but does not guarantee, priority review
in six months—four months faster than its goal for standard review83 and
seven months faster than its median standard approval time in 2006.84
Although § 360n largely followed Ridley et al.’s proposal for
granting and using PRVs, the legislation included a few important
differences. Both Ridley et al.’s proposal and § 360n limit the grant of
PRVs to drugs that treat neglected tropical diseases. Ridley et al.’s
proposal, however, included more provisions aimed at maximizing the
social benefit of these drugs. The proposal envisioned limiting the grant
of PRVs to companies that developed drugs or biologics exhibiting
clinical superiority to existing treatments, companies that had foregone
patent rights to the product, and companies that had identified at least
one manufacturer for the tropical disease product. The impetus behind
this limitation was a desire to increase the odds that the awardee would
actually make the drug available.85 Furthermore, Ridley et al.’s proposal
also suggested that the FDA adjust the incentive for developing
treatments for neglected tropical diseases as needed by offering multiple
PRVs.86 Despite these suggestions, no such flexibility exists in the

78

DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 75, at 2.
21 U.S.C. § 360n(b)(2).
80
§ 360n(a)(2).
81
§ 360n(a)(1).
82
DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 75, at 4.
83
Id.
84
THAUL, supra note 61, at 5 tbl.2.
85
Ridley, supra note 26, at 314.
86
Id. at 319.
79
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current legislation,87 and it is unclear why these provisions were not
included.
The PRV program, developed from Ridley et al.’s proposal,
works in tandem with other legislative tools toward promoting
investment in neglected disease products. The FDA’s 2008 Guidance for
the PRV program indicated that a tropical disease product qualifying for
a PRV would likely also qualify for benefits under the Orphan Drug Act
(ODA).88 The incentive to develop a drug for a rare tropical disease
under the PRV program should be even greater when paired with ODA
incentives, such as tax credits on R&D costs. Based on Ridley et al.’s
calculations, the drug sponsor would receive a net benefit of
approximately $570 million from a PRV. This includes approximately
$321 million from the PRV itself, plus approximately $252 million in tax
credits from the ODA. Together, the benefit from the PRV and the ODA
exceed the mean clinical trial cost of $504 million of all drugs (in 2004
dollars).89 Additionally, a drug sponsor would receive goodwill for
developing a drug that treats a neglected tropical disease.90
3. Criticism of the PRV program
Although the PRV program seeks to promote the development of
drugs with social value, some scholars argue that the PRV program is
inefficient at best and dangerous at worst.91 For example, Kesselheim, a
research associate in Harvard’s School of Public Health, opines that the
PRV program “is inefficient because the program does not directly
connect the incentive with the innovation.”92 Furthermore, although
companies without “blockbuster” drugs in their pipeline can sell the
voucher to companies that are better situated to use it, Kesselheim claims
that such deals will lack transparency and “raise the cost or restrict the
future availability of the products.”93 Other potential inefficiencies
include the criticism that the PRV legislation does not allow the FDA to
vary the reward based upon the utility of the drug.94
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Some scholars also fear that PRVs will compromise drug
safety.
Traditionally, the FDA only granted priority review when a
drug was a “[m]ajor advancement in treatment or treatment where no
adequate therapy exists.”96 Conversely, with a PRV, a company may
obtain priority review for drugs with little clinical value. Kesselheim
argues that the safety risks inherent in priority FDA review are justified
only for drugs treating “serious problems.”97 Ridley et al., however,
argue that drugs that underwent expedited FDA review did not have a
higher rate of safety problems than drugs that underwent standard
review.98 Therefore, as demonstrated by Ridley et al., the PRV program
will not compromise drug safety.
95

The FDA’s Draft Guidance for Priority Review Vouchers
highlights other possible limits of the PRV program. First, a sponsor
may win a PRV whether or not it markets the product.99 Without
guaranteed marketing of the product, the program may not fulfill its goal
of increasing the availability of drugs for the developing world. Second,
drugs that have already been approved for another indication100 or
already approved for adults cannot receive a PRV.101 By forbidding PRV
grants to drugs with active ingredients that the FDA previously
approved, the program may fail to incentivize new pediatric formulations
or new combination products that include known drugs. Another
legislative shortcoming is manifest within the requirement that the drug
sponsor notify the FDA of its intent to use a PRV one year before it
submits its application.102 Once the sponsor notifies the FDA, it is
legally bound to pay the user fee.103 Considering the uncertainties that
accompany drug development and the magnitude of the user fee ($3.6
95
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million for Fiscal Year 2013), committing to using a PRV one year in
advance is a financially precarious prospect for the drug sponsor.
4. The first grant and use of a PRV
Because the PRV program is relatively new, “the actions of the
FDA in how it handles the priority review vouchers will help shape the
success of the tropical disease incentive program.”104 Since the PRV
program’s inception, the pharmaceutical industry has had the chance to
observe only one PRV grant and one redemption of a PRV. The first
grant and use of a PRV answered some questions, but many remain.
Swiss-based Novartis received the first priority review voucher
in 2009 for its anti-malarial drug Coartem (a combination of two existing
drugs: artemether and lumefantrine).105 Coartem met all of the PRV
grant requirements: it treated a tropical disease, qualified for priority
review, and had never before been approved by the FDA. However,
even though the FDA had never before approved the active ingredients in
Coartem, these active ingredients had been in use in the developing
world since 2001.106 Critics of the PRV program argued that the FDA
provided an “undeserved windfall” to Novartis because the active
ingredients were not novel.107
Supporters of the PRV program
acknowledged that the first awardee may have received the PRV simply
through serendipity, but argued that the program would still incentivize
the development of novel drugs over time.108
Novartis waited until 2011 to redeem its voucher for priority
review on its supplemental biologics license application (sBLA) for Ilaris
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(canakinub) to treat gouty arthritis.109 However, rather than the early
approval Novartis hoped for, the FDA requested additional clinical data
on the risks to patients.110 After this result, critics of the PRV program
pointed out that Novartis paid a $5,280,000 priority voucher user fee on
top of the sBLA fee without receiving any benefit.111
The criticisms of the first PRV award to Novartis for Coartem
and the subsequent first use of the PRV for Ilaris may be greatly
exaggerated. Regardless of the request for more clinical data, the total
review time for Coartem still outpaced standard review.112 BIO Ventures
for Global Health points out that “[i]t is important to keep in mind that
the PRV program was never designed to produce a different outcome
upon FDA review, but simply a faster outcome.”113 The claimed
“failures” of the first grant and use of a PRV may actually be successes,
demonstrating the FDA’s commitment to honoring the vouchers without
compromising safety and providing future voucher holders with more
guidance on how to maximize the voucher’s value.114
A recent survey shed light on certain reservations held by drug
companies with regard to the PRV program.115 The survey revealed that
most companies viewed the PRV program as an additional factor, but not
the deciding factor, in their decision to pursue drugs or vaccines for
neglected tropical diseases.116 The potential market value of the drug or
vaccine was still the overriding factor in a company’s decision to
instigate research.117 Companies expressed concern over not knowing
the true value of the voucher and also worried that the FDA would not
support the program.118 Companies said they would consider the PRV
program more of an incentive after “a demonstrated sale of a voucher,
with the purchase price disclosed to developers.”119 However, given the
109
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fact that drug development takes several years, the PRV program’s
success or failure cannot be evaluated so quickly.120 In fact, the potential
benefits of the PRV program are still so attractive that Congress recently
extended the program to rare pediatric diseases.121

II. CREATING HOPE ACT
President Obama signed the Creating Hope Act (CHA) into law
as part of the Food & Drug Administration Safety & Innovation Act
(FDASIA) on July 9, 2012.122 The CHA aims to ameliorate perceived
weaknesses in the original PRV program and extend the program to
drugs for rare pediatric diseases.123 A rare pediatric disease is one that
“primarily affects individuals from birth to 18 years, including age
groups often called neonates, infants, children and adolescents.”124 In
March 2011, Senator Bob Casey introduced the bill to “strengthen a costneutral FDA program giving biopharmaceutical companies an incentive
to develop treatments for rare diseases that are often less profitable than
treatments for more common medical conditions.”125 Nancy Goodman,
founder of the Kids v. Cancer advocacy organization and a champion for
the Creating Hope Act, similarly believes the Act will “encourage the
creation of new drugs for underserved children who suffer from serious
and rare medical conditions, including life-threatening cancers . . . .”126

A. Differences Between the PRV Legislation for Rare Pediatric
Diseases and the PRV Legislation for Neglected Tropical Diseases
The legislation for rare pediatric diseases largely mirrors the
original PRV legislation for neglected tropical diseases, but with some
important differences. First, new 21 U.S.C. § 360ff will increase
economic efficiency by making explicit that entities may transfer a PRV
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an unlimited number of times.127 The original PRV program, codified in
§ 360n, left open the question of whether the voucher could be sold to
another entity.128 By making explicit that entities may sell the voucher an
unlimited number of times, the CHC reduces the perceived risk for the
voucher’s would-be purchaser.
Second, new § 360ff reduces the period required for notifying
the FDA of intent to use the voucher from 365 days to 90 days before
use.129 This change makes voucher use less risky for a drug sponsor.
Because the notification of a drug sponsor’s intent to redeem the voucher
is “a legally binding commitment”130 to pay a $3.6 million fee,131 drug
sponsors desire as much clinical data as possible before committing to
redeem the voucher. The ninety-day requirement balances the drug
sponsor’s need for gathering data before committing and the FDA’s need
for adequate advanced notice to gather enough resources for the priority
review process.
Third, the CHA allows the new drug sponsor to obtain a
designation at the beginning of the application process that the drug is an
eligible treatment for a rare pediatric disease.132 With this early
designation, the drug sponsor is assured that it will receive a voucher if
the drug is approved. By contrast, under the original PRV legislation,
drug sponsors remain uncertain about whether the drug is even eligible
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for a PRV until the FDA grants or denies approval.133 Like the
provisions for clarifying transferability and reducing the length of
notification, the early designation provision makes the PRV program less
risky for a drug sponsor.
Fourth, the CHA requires an assessment of the PRV program
after the FDA has awarded three PRVs, and allows termination of the
PRV program at that time.134 The Government Accountability Office is
instructed to “conduct a study of the effectiveness of awarding rare
pediatric disease priority vouchers under this section in the development
of human drug products that treat or prevent such diseases.”135 This
provision allows an independent assessment of the efficacy of the
program, which was lacking from the original PRV legislation.

B. Collateral Effects of the CHA
Although the transfer, notification, and designation provisions in
the CHA go a long way toward encouraging the use of PRVs, some
provisions may have collateral effects.136 First, the CHA may fail to
incentivize the development of the most promising new treatments for
rare pediatric diseases. The CHA prohibits drug sponsors from receiving
a PRV for a rare pediatric disease product with active ingredients that the
FDA has approved in any other application.137 Although such a provision
is helpful for preventing gamesmanship when applied to tropical disease
133
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products, the provision may actually compromise the incentive for the
most promising innovations for rare pediatric diseases involving cancer.
For example, this amendment in the Creating Hope Act would
exclude from reward a promising innovation in cancer therapy that
involves conjugating known chemotherapy drugs to “drug delivery
vehicles” such as nanoparticles, stem cells or T cells.138 These drug
delivery vehicles help the known chemotherapy agents bypass biological
barriers (such as the blood-brain barrier), minimize side effects of
chemotherapy drugs by specifically delivering the known drugs to cancer
sites rather than having the drugs released into the entire body, and aid in
preventing drug resistance and monitoring treatment.139 Nanoparticles
attached to a standard chemotherapy drug, docetexel, have been shown to
cause complete remission of lymphoma in mice.140 Furthermore, selfassembling antibody nanorings and other nanoparticles conjugated to
known chemotherapy drugs have shown promise in treating leukemia, a
deadly cancer in children.141 Similar strides have been made using iron
oxide nanovehicles to transport the known cancer drug, doxorubicin, to
prevent multidrug resistance in a sort of ‘Trojan Horse’ mechanism.142
If the promise of a PRV is limited to drugs that contain no active
ingredients previously approved by the FDA, the PRV program will not
work to incentivize companies to use known chemotherapy drugs with
these novel delivery vehicles. Legislatures should not tailor the
requirements of obtaining a PRV too narrowly to traditional notions of
drug development while inadvertently excluding the most promising
mechanisms of innovation.
Even without considering the next wave of cancer therapy
innovation, many successful treatments for rare pediatric diseases have
historically involved finding new uses for known drugs. In 2011, for
example, the FDA approved Soliris (eculizumab) for the rare pediatric
blood disorder of atypical Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome (aHUS). The
138
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FDA had previously approved Soliris for the rare adult condition of
Paroxysmal Nocturnal Hemoglobinuria (PNH).143 Under the CHA,
Soliris would not receive a PRV because the drug had already been
approved for adults. Arguably, the PRV program should encourage
investigation into using known adult drugs to treat rare pediatric
diseases.
Second, the CHA may hasten the entry of pediatric applications
at the needless expense of delaying adult treatments. Under the CHA, a
rare pediatric disease product application is ineligible for a PRV if it
“seek[s] approval for an adult indication in the original rare pediatric
disease product application.”144 Preventing drug sponsors from applying
for both adult and pediatric indications simultaneously will simply delay
adult treatments rather than encourage pediatric developments. Such a
provision will also increase total regulatory costs by encouraging
companies to seek approval for pediatric and adult indications at
different times without the benefit of economies of scale in the
regulatory process. Empirical evidence may elucidate how often
treatments for pediatric and adult diseases overlap and what benefit, if
any, pediatric patients would receive by delaying adult treatment.
Third, the CHA may disproportionately burden universities and
small companies. The CHA’s marketing requirement is aimed at
encouraging drug sponsors to manufacture and market drugs post
approval.145 For rare pediatric disease products, the provision allows the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to revoke a priority review
voucher if the product is not marketed in the United States within a year
of FDA approval.146 For all its good intentions, this marketing
requirement may disproportionately affect universities and small
businesses. Because a university’s expertise exists primarily in creating
knowledge and conducting research, it is unreasonable for these entities
to be required to take on the burden of marketing the drug. Congress
should consider other options of encouraging drug sponsors to market the
drug, such as creating an exemption for universities, requiring entities to
give up or sell their intellectual property rights if they do not intend to
market the drug, or providing a second reward or recognition five years
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after initial approval for entities that do succeed in promoting access to
the drug.
Fourth, the Creating Hope Act fails to create a nexus between the
magnitude of the reward and the drug’s improvement over existing
therapies. One criticism of the PRV program for neglected tropical
disease products is the lack of a link between the reward and utility of the
drug.147 The Creating Hope Act fails to rectify this problem. Section
360n(b) orders the Secretary to award a PRV upon approval of any
tropical disease product application, with no regard to the extent that the
drug will improve human health.148 Congress should consider whether
this one-size-fits-all reward system best advances its objective of
improving the lives of people suffering from neglected tropical diseases
or rare pediatric diseases. The PRV program may encourage the
development of more desirable drugs if sponsors could receive a second
PRV five years after approval for drugs found to significantly impact the
Quality-Adjusted Life year (QALY) or Disability-Adjusted Life year
(DALY) of the target population. QALY and DALY are standard
calculations for the economic value of medical treatments.
Finally, extending the PRV program to rare pediatric diseases
may actually undermine the PRV program for neglected tropical
diseases. On one hand, the PRV program for neglected tropical diseases
has resulted in only one grant and use of a PRV in the last five years.
Thus, awarding a PRV for a rare pediatric disease drug product may help
jumpstart the program for neglected tropical diseases by resolving some
of the current legislation’s ambiguity. On the other hand, the transfer
value of a PRV depends on the number of vouchers on the market. If the
market is flooded with PRVs, the value of each will decline. Congress
should therefore evaluate whether extending the program to rare
pediatric diseases will actually result in a reduced value for PRVs and
reduced incentives for sponsors.

CONCLUSION
The priority review voucher (PRV) program holds great promise
as a tool to both increase investment in drugs used to treat neglected
diseases and reward sponsors for their innovations without burdening
taxpayers. However, Congress may have prematurely extended the
program to rare pediatric diseases by signing the Creating Hope Act into
147
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law under the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act
of 2012. Although founded on the best intentions, the Creating Hope Act
may exclude some of the most promising research areas for pediatric
drug development, needlessly delay adult treatments at only a marginal
benefit for pediatric patients, disproportionately burden small businesses
and universities, fail to link the utility of the drug to the magnitude of the
reward, and possibly even undermine the PRV program that already
exists for tropical disease products. The GAO should consider all these
possible collateral effects when it evaluates the program.149 The GAO’s
evaluation will elucidate whether these concerns are valid and will help
guide the drafting of future legislation seeking to expand the PRV
program to other classes of neglected diseases.
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